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I. INTRODUCTION
For many adults, a central concern in life is the health and welfare of their children. A new baby ushers in decades of dedicated
work and anxiety to foster the child’s life, to limit the inevitable pain,
and to provide every advantage parents can reasonably afford. For
most of human history, this work began at birth1 because, until recently, pregnancy was a black box, largely beyond parental influence
other than through prayers and wholesome living. This situation has
changed profoundly over the past twenty-five years. An array of
technologies now can provide a detailed examination of the embryo
and fetus, genetically, biochemically, and anatomically. The day is
not yet here when we can effectively change the embryo or fetus from
these perspectives, but we can effectively choose to accept or reject
what we find. The ability to select our children based on detailed biologic characteristics is new. Efforts to provide the child with every
advantage may begin with choosing the desired child at the very beginning. Questions over whether our society should promote or restrict this power also are new. These new capabilities will likely create one of the most difficult and divisive social debates over the next
century.
This Article examines the debate from a professional perspective.
Because those in the medical profession are gatekeepers for prenatal
diagnostic technology, one approach to these questions is to ask what

* Professor of Pediatrics, Adjunct Professor of Internal Medicine in the Division of
Human Genetics, University of Utah. A.B., Princeton University; M.D., University of Pittsburgh; Fellowship in Law, Ethics and Health, Johns Hopkins University in affiliation with
the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University. This Article was supported by a
grant from the National Genome Research Institute (#HGO 1966-02).
1. Pregnant women throughout recorded history have attempted to protect and foster their children before birth by eating good food and avoiding alcoholic drinks and physical labor during pregnancy. Until the last century, the medical community thought that
maternal experiences could affect the developing child in quite specific ways. For example,
a negative influence might be the sighting of a rabbit that was thought to result in a “hare
lip.” Alternatively, by exposing pregnant women to beautiful art and music, children
gained positive influences. This tradition continues today in the recent fad over encouraging women to expose their developing fetuses to classical music.
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tests and technologies the ethical practitioner should provide.2 The
answers to this question can be guided by professional, ethical and
legal standards that are emerging in genetic medicine. This Article
begins by offering three hypothetical clinical scenarios to frame the
issues.
Case #1: Molly and Bert are pregnant with their third child.
Molly is 36 years of age, Bert is 39, and both are in good health, as
are their two other children. The pregnancy proceeds uneventfully
under the guidance of their obstetrician, Dr. Owen. Dr. Owen is religiously and philosophically opposed to pregnancy termination other
than for the protection of the life of the mother and, given the smooth
course of this pregnancy, he does not discuss prenatal diagnosis with
the couple. Dr. Owen recognizes that this failure to offer prenatal diagnosis is contrary to the prevailing standard of care. Women who
will be 35 years of age or older at the time of delivery are at increased
risk of bearing a child with Down syndrome and other syndromes
caused by an increased number of chromosomes.3 Therefore, it has
been standard practice for at least two decades to offer prenatal diagnosis to women of “advanced maternal age” to detect these conditions, if the parents so choose. Molly’s pregnancy proceeds to term, at
which time she delivers a small infant girl, Alexandra, with the stigmata of Down syndrome. Chromosome analysis confirms the presence of Trisomy 21. Additional evaluation also confirms the presence
of complex congenital heart disease in the infant.
Molly and Bert are shocked and saddened at the realization of
Alexandra’s diagnosis and of the difficult challenges ahead for them
and for their child. As they learn that prenatal diagnosis could have
predicted this outcome, they become increasingly angry. Had they
been offered prenatal diagnosis,4 they would have accepted. Upon
2. A separate approach would be to ask what sorts of prenatal tests and technologies
should be used by an ethical couple. This question is less well explored than the professional standards question. Also, the question for prospective parents often becomes mired
in abortion politics.
3. Down syndrome is also termed Trisomy 21. KENNETH LYONS JONES, SMITH’S
RECOGNIZABLE PATTERNS OF HUMAN MALFORMATION 8-13 (5th ed. 1997). Humans normally have a total of forty-six chromosomes in each cell, twenty-three from the person’s
mother and twenty-three from the father. LYNN B. JORDE ET AL., MEDICAL GENETICS 7
(Emma B. Underdown ed., 1995). The chromosomes are numbered from one through
twenty-two plus the X and Y chromosomes that determine gender. Id. Therefore each of us
normally has two #21 chromosomes. In Down syndrome, three #21 chromosomes are present, two from one parent and one from the other. JONES, supra, at 8-13. This extra chromosome causes the common characteristics of Down syndrome that include mild to moderate mental retardation, characteristic faces, and heart and/or bowel abnormalities. Id.
Other less common trisomy syndromes include Trisomy 18 and Trisomy 13, both of which
cause profound mental retardation and typically an early death. Id. at 14-23.
4. The term “prenatal diagnosis” encompasses a range of technologies. Amniocentesis is perhaps most familiar; a needle is inserted into the amniotic sac surrounding the fetus at about 16 weeks gestation. Fetal cells are isolated from the fluid and their chromo-
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learning of the affected fetus, they would have regretfully, but surely,
terminated the pregnancy. Molly and Bert choose to bring a legal
claim against Dr. Owen for his failure to provide timely information
about their reproductive risks and options.
The question for our analysis is whether the parents should have
a valid legal or ethical claim. Should Dr. Owen be held legally or
ethically responsible for the birth of this impaired child?
Case #2: Alice and Jack are pregnant with their first child. In
their initial prenatal visit with Dr. Owen, he took a brief family history of both sides of the family to identify genetic risks to the developing child. However, Dr. Owen failed to take an adequate family history concerning cancer. Jack’s sister developed breast cancer at age
37, his mother died recently of ovarian cancer at age 59, and his maternal aunt had breast cancer at age 46. This family pattern is
suggestive of a heritable mutation in either the BRCA1 or BRCA2
genes. Women who are mutation carriers for BRCA1 or BRCA2 have
a lifetime risk of up to eighty-five percent for breast or ovarian
cancer. While there are no significant health risks to a man who is a
mutation carrier for either of these genes, he can transmit the mutation to his daughters and sons. Genetic testing for BRCA1 and
BRCA2 mutations has been available clinically for about seven years.
Alice’s pregnancy proceeds uneventfully to term. A vigorous,
healthy baby girl, Anastasia, is born. Six months later, Jack’s sister
learns through genetic testing that she has a BRCA1 mutation. Jack
and, subsequently, Anastasia obtain genetic testing, revealing that
they both carry the BRCA1 mutation. Alice and Jack are devastated.
After watching the difficult death of Jack’s mother and the suffering
of his sister and aunt with breast cancer, they can only look forward
with dread to the future of their beautiful little girl. Why didn’t Dr.
Owen take an adequate family history? Had they learned of their risk
in a timely fashion, they would have done BRCA1 testing on the fetus
and terminated the pregnancy without hesitation. They bring suit
against Dr. Owen for his failure to provide timely information about
their reproductive risks and options.
The question for our analysis is whether the parents should have
a valid legal or ethical claim. Should Dr. Owen be held legally or
ethically responsible for the birth of this child?
Case #3: Susan and Jim Jingle are pregnant with their fifth child.
At only eight weeks gestation, Susan and Jim are thrilled but not
ready to announce the pregnancy to the family or the public. They
somes are analyzed. Chorionic villous sampling (CVS) can be performed earlier in the
pregnancy. CVS involves insertion of a needle or catheter to sample cells from the fetal
side of the placenta which contain the same chromosome structure as the fetus itself. Ultrasound is available to provide a detailed anatomic examination of the fetus.
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recognize that this news would be met with some public fanfare because the Jingle family is a highly popular singing and musical group
called, appropriately, “The Jingles.” Both Susan and Jim have perfect
musical pitch, as do all of their four children. This innate talent has
allowed the children to develop extraordinary musical skills at young
ages, albeit with intensive training and practice beginning by age 3.
There is a strong family history of perfect musical pitch on both sides
of the family, and both families have had noted musicians and entertainers for generations. This kind of family history is unusual, but
not so rare that it escaped the attention of geneticists.5 Imagine for
the purposes of this Article that a molecular biologist in England recently identified a gene variant that confers perfect musical pitch in
the majority of individuals who carry this variant. A prominent
medical journal published the finding and, subsequently, several
other investigators have confirmed the association in additional families.
Susan and Jim are hopeful that this new baby will fit in the family mold. Indeed, they are a little fearful of how they would raise a
child that could not be an integral member of the family activity—
and not to mention the creative and financial possibilities of a cute
new Jingle in the band. They ask Dr. Owen, Susan’s obstetrician,
about the possibility of having another child with perfect musical
pitch. He chuckled, “Oh, who knows? These kinds of things are
mostly just plain luck, although you folks have been awfully lucky
with the other kids. So, I guess the chances are pretty good this one
will be talented, too.” Sadly, though, this one was not talented. Susan
and Jim learned of the genetic test for the “musical pitch gene”
through a magazine interview late in Susan’s pregnancy. It was too
late to do prenatal testing but they had their baby tested while he
was a newborn. He had not inherited the trait from either parent,
and so, while he was healthy, he would have no more innate musical
talent than any random kid off the street. Their disappointment was
further fueled by the knowledge that Susan could have had prenatal
diagnosis for this trait well before the public knew she was pregnant.
Dr. Owen had given them false information and he obviously did not
have enough professional good sense to look up the correct answer to
their question. Music is the lifeblood of their family, not some trivial
trait like blue eyes or big ears. This was too important to leave to
dumb luck. The Jingles brought suit against Dr. Owen, claiming that
had he accurately informed Susan and Jim about the availability of a
genetic test, they would have used it and terminated the pregnancy
upon detection of the undesirable fetus.
5. See, e.g., Joseph Profita & T. George Bidder, Perfect Pitch, 29 AM. J. MED.
GENETICS 763 (1988) (studying note recognition capacity in thirty-five subjects).
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The question for our analysis is whether the parents should have
a valid legal or ethical claim. Should Dr. Owen be held legally or
ethically responsible for the birth of this child?
II. THE LEGAL CONCEPTS OF WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL BIRTH
Over the past twenty years, the courts have provided a partial
answer to the questions posed by these cases. Wrongful life and
wrongful birth are two related medical malpractice actions that have
arisen since the 1973 Roe v. Wade6 decision to address claims of negligence leading to the birth of an impaired child. Health care providers are the usual defendants in these suits after the birth of a child
with congenital malformations or a genetic disease. Wrongful birth
actions refer to suits by the parents who claim harm to themselves
from the birth of an ill or disabled child.7 Parents in these suits typically claim that, had they been adequately informed of their reproductive risk, they would have taken measures to prevent the pregnancy or birth of the affected child.8 Wrongful life claims are brought
in similar clinical circumstances; however, these claims arise from
the child who asserts harm from birth in an impaired condition.9 But
for the negligence of the health care provider, the child claims she
would not have been born to suffer with her condition.10 Neither of
these claims is based on allegations that the defendant caused the
impairment through negligent actions as, say, through the use of a
teratogenic drug. Wrongful life and wrongful birth claims are based
on allegations of inadequate or incorrect information that would have
permitted the parents to avoid pregnancy or to detect the abnormality prenatally and terminate the pregnancy.11
The wrongful life and wrongful birth suits have become increasingly prevalent over the past three decades for at least two reasons.
First, Roe v. Wade established constitutional protection for abortion
decisions through the first two trimesters of pregnancy. Second,
medicine is offering an expanding array of technologies to evaluate
the health of the fetus. In light of these developments, health care
providers are seen to have parallel obligations to offer testing in a variety of clinical circumstances, and to adequately warn couples who
have an increased risk of bearing a child with a heritable condition or
congenital malformation. Failure to provide timely, accurate infor-

6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 487 (Wash. 1983).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 494.
10. Id.
11. Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice Liability for Failure to
Warn of Genetic Risks, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 149, 152-57 (1992).
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mation according to the standard of care may leave providers liable
under wrongful life and/or wrongful birth suits.
The wrongful life claim has met with limited success. To date, five
state courts have recognized the wrongful life claim,12 while nineteen
have rejected this tort.13 The primary difficulty for the wrongful life
claim has been the implicit claim that a child would prefer nonexistence to existence in an impaired condition. In these circumstances, existence without the condition was never a possibility for
these children. So, the choice on behalf of the child was existence
with impairments or non-existence through contraception or pregnancy termination. The children must assert that, but for the negligence of the defendant, they would not exist. In response to this dilemma, most courts have adopted the reasoning first articulated in
the New York case of Becker v. Schwartz,14 in which the fundamental
philosophic problem with wrongful life suits was described:
The first, in a sense the more fundamental [problem with wrongful
life claims], is that it does not appear that the infants suffered any
legally cognizable injury. . . . Whether it is better never to have
been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and
the theologians. Surely the law can assert no competence to resolve the issue. . . . Not only is there to be found no predicate at
common law or in statutory enactment for judicial recognition of
the birth of a defective child as an injury to the child; the implications of any such proposition are staggering.15

The few courts that have recognized the wrongful life claims often
have been willing largely to overlook the philosophical problems inherent in the claim and to support the suits based on the medical
needs of the child and/or the public policy advantages of deterring
12. See, e.g., Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 483; see also Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 96566 (Cal. 1982); Quinn v. Blau, No. CV 963256915, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3319, at *8
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1997); Rosen v. Katz, No. 93-394A, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS
618 at *10-11 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1996); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760 (N.J.
1984).
13. Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz.
1990); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del.,
Inc., 581 A.2d 288 (Del. 1989); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987); Kush v.
Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992); Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398
S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987);
Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So.
2d 1151 (La. 1988); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990); Proffit v. Bartolo, 412
N.W.2d 232 (Mich. App. 1987); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Flanagan v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d
872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975); Beardsley v.
Weirdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
14. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
15. Id. at 812.
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negligent medical care.16 A California court in 1980 concluded:
The reality of the “wrongful life” concept is that such a plaintiff
both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others. It is neither necessary nor just to retreat into meditation on the mysteries
of life. We need not be concerned with the fact that had defendants
not been negligent, the plaintiff might not have come into existence at all.17

While the trend has been against the wrongful life concept, courts
in both Massachusetts and Connecticut have supported the tort
within the past few years. A 1997 decision by the Connecticut Superior Court, quoting a 1983 decision, stated: “There is nothing illogical
in a plaintiff saying ‘I’d rather not be suffering as I am, but since
your wrongful conduct preserved my life, I am going to take advantage of my regrettable existence to sue you.’”18 A Massachusetts court
was faced with a case in which a suit was brought against a physician who failed to report abnormalities on a fetal ultrasound and to
repeat the examination.19 The mother gave birth to a child with heart
and bowel abnormalities, and the parents relinquished the child for
adoption.20 The court concluded:
Corey’s parents are not entitled to recover against the defendant
for the ongoing extraordinary costs that Corey will incur because
of the defect (due to the fact that they are no longer his legal
guardians or official parents). Nor will Corey’s adoptive parents be
entitled to recover, since the defendant owed them no duty. Therefore, this Court must consider whether Corey should have this
cause of action since no one else can recover the extraordinary
costs. . . . In this situation, it appears fair . . . to require the negligent Doctor to pick up these costs if negligence is proven.21

Therefore, in order to assure adequate care to a child with disabilities, some courts have been willing to recognize wrongful life
claims without explicitly declaring that life with disability can be
worse than non-existence.
The New York Court of Appeals in Becker v. Schwartz22 deferred
to philosophers and theologians on the basic question of whether ex16. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), disapproved of by Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
17. Id. at 488.
18. Quinn v. Blau, No. CV96325691S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3319, at *21 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1997) (quoting Alexander Morgan Capron, The Continuing Wrong of
“Wrongful Life,” in GENETICS AND THE LAW II, at 81, 89 (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds., 1979)).
19. Rosen v. Katz, No. 93-394A, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 618, at *1 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Feb. 14, 1996).
20. Id. at *2.
21. Id. at *9-10.
22. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
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istence confers a harm for some children. Bioethicists, theologians,
and physicians have offered a range of opinions on this question.
John Lorber, a British surgeon, wrote in 1975 of the deliberate nontreatment of some severely affected children with spina bifida:
There are ethicists and moralists, as well as doctors, who consider
that life must be maintained at any cost, because any life is better
than no life. It may be legitimate to adhere to such principles
within their own family, but is it not right to enforce such a philosophy on others who do not hold with it. To my knowledge none
of the world’s great religions or religious leaders believe that a severely defective innocent newborn infant would be worse off in
heaven or wherever they believe their souls will go after death. Is
it therefore humane to inflict an immense amount of suffering on
such infants and on their families to ensure that they reach this
heaven or haven in the end?23

Margery Shaw, a geneticist and attorney, argued that “fetal
abuse,” through knowingly bringing a child to birth with a genetic
condition, should be made analogous to child abuse in the law.24 She
would sanction not only wrongful life suits against negligent physicians, but similar suits against parents.
[P]arents should be held accountable to their children if they
knowingly and willfully choose to transmit deleterious genes or if
the mother waives her right to an abortion if, after prenatal testing, a fetus is discovered to be seriously deformed or mentally defective. They have added to the burdens of the other family members, they have incurred a cost to society, and, most importantly,
they have caused needless suffering in their child.25

In fact, the wrongful life claim raises this odd question of the parents’
responsibility for the birth of an affected child. When prenatal diagnosis detects a fetus with a genetic condition or congenital malformation, some parents choose to continue the pregnancy. Also, parents at
risk for bearing a child with a genetic condition may choose to forego
prenatal diagnosis and accept the risk of an affected child. As argued
by Shaw, might the affected child have a wrongful life claim against
the parents? The State of California was concerned enough about this
possibility after the success of a wrongful life claim in the case of
Curlender v. Bio-Science26 that it passed legislation barring suits by
children against parents for the harm of their existence.27
23. John Lorber, Ethical Problems in the Management of Myelomeningocele and Hydrocephalus, 10 J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS 47, 58 (1975).
24. See Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL
MED. 63, 111 (1984).
25. Id.
26. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982).
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In contrast to these authors, James Bopp, Barry Bostrom, and
Donald McKinney argue from a “right to life” perspective that one of
the very foundations of modern law and civilized society is that life
has enormous intrinsic value.28
[W]rongful birth/life claims . . . require a new legal theory, in that
life itself is considered a wrong, and death is preferred over life
with disabilities. By deviating from the general principle, historically found in civilized law, that life, even with disabilities, is
valuable and that only wrongful death is compensable, wrongful
birth/life actions are a radical departure from fundamental legal
philosophy.29

Similarly, authors writing from a disabilities rights perspective assert that it is simply wrong that those with disabilities lead lives of
hopeless despair.30 The greatest difficulties for those with impairments, it is claimed, are often not due to the condition per se, but to
the discriminatory attitudes and barriers in society. Wrongful life
(and wrongful birth) suits are seen by many of these authors as reflective of an inaccurate and inappropriate attitude in society toward
life with a disability.
Finally, some bioethicists claim that the assertion that life with
impairments is worse than non-existence is only justifiable for a few
extremely severe conditions.31 From the perspective of the child, even
the most rudimentary awareness and existence might be sufficient to
experience a life of value. According to these authors, the kinds of
conditions for which wrongful life suits have been brought, such as
Down syndrome or congenital rubella syndrome, would not be justified from the perspective of the child.
The limited success of the wrongful life suits is not likely to
change in the next decade or two. The primary challenge to these
claims is the philosophical conundrum they pose. Some courts have
been willing to overlook this problem in search of support for a disabled plaintiff when adequate support for medical expenses is not
otherwise available.32 We might expect this pattern to continue in the
28. James Bopp et al., The “Rights” and “Wrongs” of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful
Life: A Jurisprudential Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 461, 514-15
(1989).
29. Id. at 514.
30. See Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE
LAWS FOR THE 1990S 69 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989); Deborah Kaplan, Prenatal Screening and Diagnosis: The Impact on Persons with Disabilities, in WOMEN AND
PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 49 (1994).
31. See Jeffrey R. Botkin, The Legal Concept of Wrongful Life, 259 JAMA 1541, 154445 (1988); Bonnie Steinbock & Ron McClamrock, When is Birth Unfair to the Child?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 15.
32. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 964 (Cal. 1982); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551
N.E.2d 8, 13 (Mass. 1990).
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future, at least until we have a more comprehensive health care financing system. But the other reason wrongful life suits are recognized or pursued is the existence of the wrongful birth claims that
usually speak to the same set of events.
The wrongful birth claims have been considerably more successful
in the courts. To date, twenty-six states,33 the District of Columbia,34
and five federal courts35 have recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth. One state has enacted legislation recognizing the validity of
wrongful birth suits.36 In contrast, five state appellate courts have rejected the claim37 and six states have enacted legislation barring
wrongful birth suits.38 Two state laws banning wrongful birth suits
have been upheld as constitutional.39 Although the national trend is
clearly toward the recognition of the claim, wrongful birth remains
controversial.
Several courts and scholars argue that the wrongful birth concept
is an extension of the constitutionally protected right to privacy in
abortion decisions.40 The claim is that abortion decisions are depend33. See Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1993); Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735
(Ariz. 1990); Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), questioned
in Goldstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Lininger v.
Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., Inc., 571 A.2d 786
(Del. 1989); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315
(Idaho 1984); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Bader v. Johnson,
675 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Arche v. United States Dept. of the Army, 798 P.2d
477 (Kan. 1990); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 519 So. 2d 105 (La. 1987); Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145 (Md. 1993); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), abrogated by Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev.
1995); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979),
declined to follow by Cauman v. George Washington Univ., 630 A.2d 1104 (D.C 1993);
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Flanagan v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. ParkeDavis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985).
34. See Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987).
35. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Liddington v. Burns,
916 F. Supp. 1127 (W.D. Okla. 1995); Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309 (D.S.C.
1989); Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
36. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 1988).
37. See Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990);
Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988);
Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985); Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126 (Okla.
1987).
38. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (Michie 1986); MINN STAT. § 145.424 (1987 Supp.); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (West 1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (West 1990); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS 21-55-2 (Michie 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1986).
39. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986); Dansby v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
40. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Haymon v. Wilkerson,
535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987); Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 18 (Minn.
1986) (Amdahl, C.J., dissenting); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); R. Keith Johns-
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ent on information about the welfare of the fetus. Therefore, reproductive choice is limited if inadequate prenatal diagnostic information is provided. It is argued that the harm in these cases is not the
birth of the impaired child, but the infringement on free choice in reproductive decisions.
In contrast, other commentators and courts argue that there is no
basis for wrongful birth suits under the umbrella of privacy as articulated in Roe v. Wade.41 The constitutional right of privacy in reproduction and abortion only prevents state interference with abortion
decisions, it is argued, and imposes no positive duties on health care
providers to provide information about the fetus.42 Two state courts
(Minnesota and Pennsylvania) have examined these arguments and
held that the state laws barring wrongful birth suits are constitutional.43 Therefore, to date, the provision of prenatal diagnostic information has not been held to be a protected right under the Constitution.
Other commentators and courts argue that wrongful birth suits
fall more appropriately under the patient’s right of informed consent.44 Informed consent relates specifically to the amount and type
of information that health care providers must provide to patients
about medical options.45 It is argued that, in the context of the medical condition of pregnancy, couples should be told the risk of a problem for the child in order to decide whether to obtain prenatal diagnosis. Under the current foundation for wrongful birth, as recognized
by the majority of the courts, physicians are held to the prevailing
standard of care for the provision of timely and accurate information
about the welfare of the child.
While there is prevalent support for the wrongful birth claim in
the judicial system, there remains a debate over the appropriate calculation of damages in courts recognizing the tort. Courts have considered several options that attempt to balance the benefits and costs
ton, Medical Malpractice and “Wrongful Birth”: A Critical Analysis of Wilson v. Kuenzi, 57
UMKC L. REV. 337 (1989); Kathryn J. Jankowski, Note, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Actions Arising From Negligent Genetic Counseling: The Need for Legislation Supporting
Reproductive Choice, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27 (1989); Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The
Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2017 (1987).
41. See Bopp et al., supra note 28, at 466-68; John Lyons, Recent Development, To Be
or Not to Be: The Pennsylvania General Assembly Eliminates Wrongful Birth and Life Actions, 34 VILL. L. REV. 681 (1989).
42. Lyons, supra note 41, at 694-95.
43. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d 10; Dansby, 623 A.2d 816.
44. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 490-91 (Wash. 1983); Jeffrey R.
Botkin & Maxwell J. Mehlman, Wrongful Birth: Medical, Legal, and Philosophical Issues,
22 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 21, 23 (1994); Pamela Sarsfield Fox, Note, Legislative Prohibition of
Wrongful Birth Actions, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1331, 1354-55 (1987).
45. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 98-100 (1986).
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of having and raising an impaired child.46 One method of calculation
is to award the parents a monetary sum equal to the costs of the continued pregnancy, the delivery, and the medical costs incurred by the
child’s impairment. These are seen as the additional costs directly incurred because of the claimed negligence of the physician. An additional award might be added to compensate for the emotional pain
and suffering of bearing and raising a child with a disability. A third
element that courts have variously considered is an offset to either of
these damages for the benefits that a child brings to a family. Therefore, the damages for emotional pain might be reduced by the jury’s
estimate of the child’s positive value to the family.
Clearly, the emotional pain from bearing and raising an impaired
child and the emotional benefits of raising any child are highly valueladen. As a result, many courts have been unwilling to allow these
kinds of calculations (or, in some circumstances, state law does not
permit these kinds of awards or offsets).47 The majority of the courts
have awarded damages for the medical costs incurred by the child’s
unwanted medical condition while the child is a minor.48
The broad recognition of the wrongful birth claim reflects and confirms the responsibility of physicians to provide timely and accurate
information about reproductive risks to prospective parents. But this
is a vague standard. What information must be provided to prospective parents? Court decisions have not articulated a broad standard
because the cases deal with individual claims and circumstances.
The single largest number of wrongful birth cases have been brought
for failure to provide information about the risk of Down syndrome to
women of “advanced maternal age.”49 Other conditions that have led
to wrongful birth suits include congenital rubella syndrome,50 spina
46. Frederick W. Bogdan, Wrongful Birth: Who Owes What to Whom and Why?, 40
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123, 136-38 (1983); John H. Scheid, Benefits vs. Burdens: The Limitation of Damages in Wrongful Birth, 23 J. FAM. L. 57, 68-78 (1984-85).
47. Bogdan, supra note 46, at 136-38; Scheid, supra note 46, at 68-78.
48. See Bader v. Johnson, 675 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), superseded by Bader
v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 2000).
49. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309 (D.S.C. 1989); Simmons v.
W. Covina Med. Clinic, 260 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of
Del., Inc., 571 A.2d 786 (Del. 1989); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987); Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Hickman v.
Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741
(Mo. 1988); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Alquijay v. St. Lukes-Roosevelt Hosp.
Ctr., 473 N.E.2d 244 (N.Y. 1984); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Azzolino
v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W.Va.
1985).
50. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Walker v. Mart, 790
P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412
N.W.2d 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), overruled by Taylor v. Surender Kurpati, 600 N.W.2d
670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Eisenbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981),
overruled by Taylor v. Surender Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Smith v.
Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984); Gleitman v.
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bifida,51 Tay-Sachs disease,52 sickle cell anemia,53 cystic fibrosis,54 and
a number of other rare conditions.55 Many of the conditions for which
wrongful birth cases have been brought have only one case for that
condition. Clearly there are only a few general rules emerging from
this pattern of tort litigation to guide practitioners.
The alleged negligence in these cases falls into three categories.
First, there are relatively well-defined population groups that are at
increased risk for certain genetic conditions. Examples include sickle
cell disease in individuals of African origin and Tay-Sachs disease in
Ashkenazi Jews. The other prime example is women of advanced maternal age. The professional error here is not identifying couples who
are at risk for conditions amenable to prenatal diagnosis and providing them timely information about test availability. A second category involves errors in making a correct diagnosis when suggestive
signs or symptoms are present. Pregnant women who contract a rubella infection (German measles) are at risk for delivering a child
with congenital malformations. A misdiagnosis of this subtle infection in the pregnant woman has been the event leading to a wrongful
birth suit in several cases.56 A third category is comprised of cases in
which an older child or other family member was misdiagnosed or
misinformed about a genetic condition. The Shroeder v. Perkel57 case
was brought after a physician failed to make a timely diagnosis of
cystic fibrosis in a boy before the birth of a second affected child. Occasionally, suits will arise from simple laboratory error as well, that
is, prenatal diagnosis was provided but the information returned to
the couple was wrong.
Within each of these categories, there is a range of information
that might be provided to prospective parents. For the purposes of
this discussion, we will focus primarily on the question of risk notification. What kinds of conditions should prompt an alert from the
physician? I have framed the discussion thus far primarily in the
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
51. See Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1993); Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d
1145 (Md. 1993); Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993).
52. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Munro v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Goldberg v.
Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
53. See Dorlin v. Providence Hosp., 325 N.W.2d 600 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982), overruled
by Taylor v. Surender Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
54. See Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).
55. See Botkin & Mehlman, supra note 44, at 24.
56. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Walker v. Mart, 790
P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
57. 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).

278

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:265

context of tort litigation. A description of the case law permits several basic conclusions. First, there is a clear tradition supporting a
minimum standard of risk communication, at least in many jurisdictions.58 There is a reasonably broad social consensus that, for example, an older pregnant woman should be informed of the increased
risk of Down syndrome and other aneuploid syndromes. Or, we can
conclude that Ashkenazi couples should be warned of their risk of
bearing a child with Tay-Sachs disease. But the second conclusion is
that we cannot rely on tort litigation alone to provide sufficient guidance to health care providers. This is true in part because case law is
primarily reactive. Further, and perhaps most importantly, the law
speaks to the minimum standard of professional behavior. What the
professional must do to avoid successful litigation is a different standard than what we would expect professionals to do to promote informed decision-making for couples during pregnancy. The primary
standard should be based on our analysis of personal, professional,
and social ethics, which may be a different standard than that dictated by law. However, the law asks the correct questions in addressing the ethical issues involved in defining a professional standard.
The remainder of this Article examines the concept of risk from
two perspectives. The first relates to the probability of the occurrence
of an adverse event. The second relates to the severity of that adverse outcome. We might decide that it is important to warn prospective parents about a serious potential outcome even when the probability is remote. In contrast, a common but relatively trivial outcome may not be deemed worthy of mention.
The knowledge at the base of each of these categories will enlarge
with the expansion of genetic knowledge and prenatal diagnostic
technology. Before returning to the arguments about limits on professional responsibilities to provide information in this context, this
Article will briefly review current developments in prenatal diagnosis.
III. THE TECHNOLOGY OF PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS
Prenatal diagnosis requires the ability to image the fetus or to
have access to embryonic or fetal tissue for analysis. The most familiar techniques are ultrasound, amniocentesis, and chorionic villous
sampling. Ultrasound involves the transmission of sound waves into
the body through an external probe and the measurement of the returning waves as they bounce off tissues in the body. The images
created produce a depiction of the external anatomy of the developing
fetus as well as internal structures like the brain, heart and kidneys.
58. See, e.g., Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 812 (N.J. 1999).
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Ultrasound is thought to be entirely safe. The primary limitation of
the technology is that the fetus must be large enough and sufficiently
developed to analyze the structure of the major organs. The remarkable advancement in recent years has been the advent of threedimensional ultrasound. This technology combines two-dimensional
images through digital addition to create stunning three-dimensional
images of the fetus. These images look much like true photographs.
From a medical perspective, these images provide detailed information about external and internal anatomy and can detect abnormalities of the brain, spine, limbs, bowel, heart, and kidneys. As this
technology continues to improve, prospective parents can expect to
have detailed color images of their child from mid-pregnancy onward.
Amniocentesis involves the insertion of a needle through the
mother’s abdomen or through the vagina into the amniotic fluid sack
surrounding the fetus. Several cc’s of fluid are removed for analysis.
This fluid contains cells that have been sloughed by the developing
fetus. These cells, in turn, contain all the genetic material of the fetus. Therefore, a genetic analysis of the fetus can be performed without removing tissues directly from its body. Amniocentesis generally
is performed at about fifteen to eighteen weeks gestation. The primary reason to perform amniocentesis is for chromosome analysis.
However, other genetic tests can be performed on the cells. As the
number of genetic tests available expands, the number of conditions
for which the fetus can be tested through amniocentesis will expand
in parallel. The procedure carries a small risk of inducing labor and
the subsequent loss of the pregnancy. The usual figure quoted is one
pregnancy loss for every two hundred procedures.59 While this risk
may seem relatively low, it should be remembered that amniocentesis as a screening tool is conducted on a large number of women who
will not have affected fetuses. Therefore, an expected “cost” to screening programs is the occasional loss of a normal fetus in the effort to
detect fetuses with specific abnormalities. Of course, it also must be
remembered that amniocentesis only detects conditions for which
professionals are specifically looking. That is, a normal amniocentesis does not warrant the general conclusion that the fetus is healthy.
Chorionic villous sampling (“CVS”) involves sampling of tissue
where the placenta interdigitates with the wall of the uterus. Since
the placenta is a product of conception, it has the same genetic material as the fetus. CVS is conducted by inserting a needle through the
abdomen or a catheter through the cervix under ultrasound guidance
to suction the tissue. The primary advantage of CVS is that it can be
59. Sherman Elias et al., Amniocentesis and Fetal Blood Sampling, in GENETIC
DISORDERS AND THE FETUS: DIAGNOSIS, PREVENTION AND TREATMENT 53-82 (Aubrey
Milunsky ed., 4th ed. 1998).
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conducted at nine to twelve weeks gestation, although it can be performed as early as six weeks and as late as fifteen weeks. Recall that
amniocentesis is usually conducted at fifteen to eighteen weeks.
Therefore CVS permits an earlier diagnosis if an abnormality is detected. It is generally thought that an earlier termination is associated with less physical and psychological trauma for the woman. The
risk of pregnancy loss for CVS is thought to be slightly higher than
for amniocentesis—approximately one percent.60
Fetal cell isolation is a fascinating new approach to prenatal diagnosis that has yet to emerge into clinical practice. Research has
shown that a tiny number of blood cells from the fetus leak through
the placenta and into the mother’s circulation during the early weeks
of pregnancy.61 These cells can be distinguished from the mother’s
cells and successfully separated in the laboratory. This means that
by eight weeks gestation, a simple blood test from the mother can
provide a sufficient number of fetal cells to do a genetic analysis. Not
only does this procedure eliminate the risks associated with amniocentesis and CVS, it also provides an even earlier diagnosis. To date,
it has been easier to detect the cells of male fetuses in the maternal
circulation due to the presence of the Y chromosome in males. The
accuracy of fetal cell isolation has not yet been considered great
enough to use this approach outside the research context.
As these brief descriptions illustrate, a goal of prenatal diagnostic
technology has been to move the point of diagnosis earlier and earlier
in pregnancy. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”) takes this
effort to the logical extreme by enabling genetic testing in the embryo
before it is even implanted in the uterus. This approach requires fertilization of the egg in the laboratory, that is, in vitro fertilization
(“IVF”). The fertilized egg is permitted to grow to an eight to twelve
cell mass at which point a cell is removed for analysis. This cell removal does not injure the embryo. The single cell can then be analyzed to determine if there are any genetic abnormalities. Typically
during IVF, approximately ten to twelve embryos are created. Using
PGD on several of the embryos permits a determination of which
embryos are “affected” and which are not. One or more embryos

60. See Mark I. Evans et al., Prenatal Diagnosis of Chromosomal and Mendelian Disorders, in FETAL DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND THE LAW 17, 27 (Mark I.
Evans et al. eds., 1989); Canadian Collaborative CVS-Amniocentesis Clinical Trial Group,
Multicentre Randomised Clinical Trial of Chorion Villus Sampling and Amniocentesis, 1
LANCET 1, 6 (1989); George G. Rhoads et al., The Safety and Efficacy of Chorionic Villus
Sampling for Early Prenatal Diagnosis of Cytogenetic Abnormalities, 320 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 610, 615 (1989).
61. Diana W. Bianchi, Fetal cells in the mother: from genetic diagnosis to diseases associated with fetal cell microchimerism, 92 EUROPEAN J. OBSTETRICS, GYNECOLOGY &
REPROD. BIOLOGY 103, 105 (2000).
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without the genetic condition would be transferred to the uterus in
hopes of initiating a pregnancy.
Initially PGD was done primarily for couples at high risk for bearing a child with a genetic condition. Some couples chose PGD in order
to avoid the choice of pregnancy termination. Of course, PGD generally involves the discarding of embryos but many couples still feel
that PGD is less ethically troubling than other forms of prenatal diagnosis. In more recent years, PGD has become common in couples
undergoing IVF for fertility reasons as a way of checking the genetic
health of the embryos prior to transfer to the uterus. Although PGD
often costs tens of thousands of dollars, more than 700 children have
been born world-wide following this procedure. To date, there do not
appear to be risks to the children who are produced from PGD.
PGD offers particularly interesting possibilities in the future for
the genetic selection of children because it may reduce the ethical
burdens of such selections. Pregnancy termination is a profoundly
important decision in a woman’s life so it is unlikely that many
women would choose to terminate a pregnancy for what might be
considered trivial reasons. Of course cultural norms and pressures
have a strong influence. For example, prenatal ultrasound for fetal
gender identification followed by pregnancy termination for female
fetuses has become relatively common in India and China. Data from
a 2000 census in China indicates that the male to female ratio for
newborn infants is as high as 135 males per 100 females in some of
the more prosperous provinces, due primarily to the availability of
prenatal ultrasound.62 Requests for prenatal diagnosis for gender selection in the United States are uncommon but not entirely unfamiliar. Anecdotally, these requests are often from individuals with a cultural background that favors male children. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that cultural norms in the United States will change so significantly in the foreseeable future that pregnancy termination for
mild or trivial conditions will become commonplace, even with the
advent of chemical abortions that may reduce the physical burdens
and increase the privacy of termination decisions.63
PGD offers an interesting alternative to pregnancy termination
with several significant advantages. The obvious advantage is the
avoidance of pregnancy termination. Again, embryos are often discarded or frozen indefinitely in the process, but many couples find
this less ethically troubling than abortion. The other key advantage
62. Ted Plafker, Sex Selection in China Sees 117 Boys Born for Every 100 Girls, 324
BRIT. MED. J. 1233, 1233 (2002).
63. See Alisa B. Goldberg et al., Misoprostol and Pregnancy, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED.
38 (2001) (discussing the medical aspects of chemical abortion); Irving M. Spitz et al.,
Early Pregnancy Termination with Mifepristone and Misoprostol in the United States, 338
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1241 (1998) (discussing the physical burdens of chemical abortions).
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is the ability to select from a number of embryos. Following hormone
stimulation of the woman, approximately ten to twelve oocytes (eggs)
can be retrieved through a laparoscopic procedure. Following fertilization and removal of the embryos that fail to develop properly, a
couple may have their choice of half a dozen embryos. In this context,
gender selection can be performed as well as selection based on any
other genetic criteria for which testing is available. While a couple
might be primarily interested in avoiding use of an embryo with serious deleterious mutation, the technology offers the opportunity for
much more fine-grained selections.
While this technology is available now, two other technical advances will increase the power of PGD. The first is the potential ability to harvest eggs in large numbers from tissue samples of the
ovary. Currently a woman’s ovaries must be stimulated with hormones to produce mature eggs capable of fertilization. In the foreseeable future, it will be possible to mature eggs in the laboratory. The
prospect is for the ability to take a slice of ovary through laparoscopic
surgery and to mature dozens or hundreds of eggs through hormone
stimulation in a dish. Following fertilization with her partner’s
sperm and subsequent PGD, the couple would have a wide selection
of potential children from which to choose. Why not a baby girl for
the first pregnancy with one set of traits, and a boy for the next
pregnancy with a different, desirable set of biologic characteristics?
The second set of emerging technologies, and the potential weakness in this hypothetical scheme, is the genetic tests themselves. The
sequencing of the human genome is virtually complete. This sequence, along with the genome sequences of a number of experimental organisms, will permit rapid progress in the identification of
genes associated with diseases, physical traits, physiologic characteristics and, potentially, mental characteristics. Along with the sequence information comes the ability to conduct tens of thousands of
genetic tests simultaneously. Therefore, to the extent that we understand how gene sequences function separately and together in the
body, we can potentially gain enormous volumes of genetic information from small tissue samples and possibly even single cells.
The challenge in predicting this kind of capability is the current
uncertainty over the relative contributions of genes, environment,
and random variation in the development of complex characteristics.
It is well recognized that for many “simple” genetic conditions involving only one gene locus, the disease severity in siblings can be quite
different even though siblings share much of the same genetic background and similar environments. It is clear that the expression of
single genes is profoundly influenced by other genes (perhaps many
other genes), environmental influences, and random variations as organisms develop and age. On the other hand, we know that genes
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play a significant role in complex traits such as intelligence. Children
having bright parents are not guaranteed to be bright themselves,
but they have a significant statistical advantage compared to children of parents with average or less than average intelligence. So, it
is important to dismiss simple notions of “genetic determinism,” that
is, the belief that genes are the essential determinants of biologic
characteristics. Yet, to my mind, it is a mistake to dismiss genes as a
significant component of complex traits.
The important question for this discussion is whether a detailed
knowledge of an embryo’s genetic makeup will permit any accurate
predictions of the future traits of that individual as a child or an
adult. Are there simply too many intervening influences between implantation and, say, grade school to make predictions meaningful?
My own guess is that such predictions will be much like predicting
the weather. The weather, too, is the result of an enormous number
of factors that interact in complex ways. So it may be impossible to
predict the weather in a given location at a given time with great accuracy, but with more data and more knowledge about interactions,
some reasonably accurate predictions are increasingly possible. In
two or three decades, the embryologist could say to a couple,
“With a healthy pregnancy, no significant injuries or illnesses as
an infant, and a stimulating early environment, embryo #56 has
an eighty percent chance of achieving an IQ above 120, and a
thirty percent chance of an IQ above 140. He also is likely to have
limited athletic ability and a seventy percent chance of moderate
obesity by adolescence. Embryo #31 on the other hand . . . .”

IV. ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE BIOLOGIC SELECTION OF CHILDREN
We can now return to the central question of this discussion.
What should be the professional’s responsibility to provide prenatal
diagnostic information? In addressing this set of issues, we should
assume that professionals are functioning within a broad social context that determines professional norms. That is, these questions are
too important to leave to physicians alone. Physicians act as the
gatekeepers but we can hope they will fulfill this role with the general guidance and approval of society.
The history of wrongful birth litigation offers some general parameters. We can say with assurance that prenatal diagnosis is here
to stay and that there are definitive obligations in many jurisdictions
to offer services to certain at-risk groups. There are also a few wellarticulated professional standards that have their roots, to some degree, in the fear of litigation. As noted, it is well-accepted that obstetricians should alert women of “advanced maternal age” to their increased risk for bearing a child with Down syndrome or other ane-
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uploid syndromes and make them aware of prenatal diagnostic capabilities.64 Similarly, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology’s Department of Professional Liability issued a statement in 1985
indicating that obstetricians should immediately begin to advise
women about the availability of the alpha-fetoprotein test (“AFP”).
This tests the pregnant woman’s blood to provide predictive information about whether the fetus might be affected with a neural tube defect such as spina bifida.65 The statement advised: “It is equally imperative that every prenatal patient be advised of the availability of
this test and that your discussion about the test and the patient’s decision with respect to the test be documented in the patient’s chart.”66
On the other hand, based on legal liability considerations, we
cannot claim that all potential prenatal diagnostic information must
be provided to couples. As noted, a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state law prohibiting wrongful life and wrongful birth torts has
not been supported in two cases.67 This means that prenatal diagnosis is not tightly linked to the notions of privacy or liberty in the
abortion context. Women have a constitutionally protected right to
make a decision about pregnancy termination in the first two trimesters of pregnancy. At least according to the two courts which have
decided this issue, there is not a parallel constitutional right to ob64. Physicians need not provide these services themselves. Professionals can fulfill
their obligations through the provision of information alone. It may then be up to the
woman to find someone who provides the service, or who would provide the service at a
price or location that the woman can manage.
65. Spina bifida is one form of “neural tube defect” that is characterized by an abnormality in the development of the coverings of the spine. JONES, supra note 3, 608-09. Children born with spina bifida (also termed myelomeningocele) typically have a protruding
sack or open tissue at some location along the length of the spine. Id. The skin and bony
protection of the spine are missing due to the failure of the neural tube to close early in fetal development. The spinal cord is exposed, leading to abnormal development and malfunction. Id. These children usually lack motor and sensory function in the areas of the
body served by that portion of the spinal cord and below.
Another form of neural tube defect is anencephaly, in which the scalp, upper skull,
and cerebral hemispheres of the brain are missing. Id. Children with anencephaly are either stillborn or die within days of delivery unless artificially supported. Id. Neural tube
defects during fetal development lead to leakage of a chemical called alpha-fetoprotein into
the amniotic fluid and subsequently into the pregnant woman’s blood stream in small concentrations. Aubrey Milunsky, Maternal Serum Screening for Neural Tube and Other Defects, in GENETIC DISORDERS AND THE FETUS, supra note 59, at 635-701. An increase in the
pregnant woman’s blood alpha-fetoprotein level can indicate that the fetus is affected with
a neural tube defect, although there are a number of other normal and abnormal causes of
such an elevation. Id. Currently, a battery of three or four chemical tests is performed on
maternal serum to evaluate the pregnancy for risk of neural tube defects and several other
conditions, including Down syndrome. Id.
66. George J. Annas, Is a Genetic Screening Test Ready When the Lawyers Say It Is?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1985, at 16, 17 (quoting the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist’s Department of Professional Liability’s “Alert” issued in May
1985).
67. See Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210, 215 (Ga. 1999); Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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tain any and all information on which a termination decision might
be based. More specifically, women have a right to decide whether
they wish to remain pregnant at all; they might not have the right to
decide whether they wish to remain pregnant with a specific fetus.
From an ethical perspective, there also is no discernable right to
be offered or to obtain a full genetic analysis of the fetus. Privacy
rights are typically framed as negative rights, that is, one has the
right to be left alone or to prevent access to personal information.68
Privacy rights cannot be used to compel the assistance of others or
compel the provision of information, even if the subsequent use of the
information is a private matter.69 More plausibly, the ethical foundation of prenatal diagnostic information is the right to make an informed decision about important health issues like reproduction. If
so, then prenatal diagnostic choices are akin to many other choices in
medical relationships. Typically in other areas of medicine, providers
are required to provide some information but not all conceivable information about available choices.
Some authors contend that the ethical standard for the provision
of prenatal diagnostic information should be all-inclusive. That is, all
information that each individual woman or couple requires to make a
decision should be provided.70 Adrienne Asch argues that such a
standard permits full choice and avoids the divisive and destructive
task of “line-drawing” whereby some conditions are deemed sufficiently severe to warrant prenatal diagnosis while others are not.71
She would prefer to limit the adverse consequences of prenatal diagnosis per se on those with disabilities by improving education about
life with disabilities and otherwise fighting inaccurate and discriminatory attitudes.72 She trusts that, with time, couples will choose not
to use or abuse prenatal diagnosis without the need to place artificial
limits through professional standards.73
There are at least several difficulties in promoting what I will call
a “comprehensive standard.” The first is the simple pragmatic concern over how such extensive and complex information could be
managed in a professional encounter. Presumably this standard requires that all conditions be discussed for which tests are available,
without respect to the prevalence of the condition or the relative risk
of the pregnancy. Even if a variety of different conditions are col68. Kimberly A. Johns, Reproductive Rights of Women: Construction and Reality in
International and United States Law, 5 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 24 (1998).
69. See Tracie B. Loring, Comment, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection Afforded by the European Union and the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421, 431
(2002).
70. See Asch, supra note 30, at 90-91.
71. Id. at 87-88.
72. Id. at 88.
73. See id. at 87-92.
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lapsed into logical categories, such as all the conditions that cause
profound intellectual disabilities, the task would remain formidable.
Obviously visits to the obstetrician (or family practitioner or nursemidwife) need to address a host of issues concerning the pregnancy
other than prenatal diagnosis so the time is limited to discuss these
issues. Further, care providers do not consistently address these issues at all at the present time. One observational study of obstetricians and nurse-midwives in 1998 found that sixty percent of first
prenatal visits addressed family history, sixty percent subsequently
addressed maternal serum markers (“AFP”), and thirty-four percent
discussed ultrasound in the second trimester.74 For women of 35
years and older, ninety-eight percent were counseled about amniocentesis or CVS. Notably, the discussion of prenatal diagnosis for
women less than 35 years took an average of 2.5 minutes while for
women 35 and older, the discussion lasted an average of 6.9 minutes.75 Of course, we also need to consider the time it would take to
explain all of the results of testing. If thousands of tests are being
conducted, dozens or even hundreds of results may be sufficiently
abnormal to warrant discussion.76
So from a practical standpoint, it is hard to imagine how expectations for a vastly expanded discussion about prenatal diagnosis could
be accommodated.77 Significantly lengthening the visits would require additional professional personnel, mechanisms to pay for the
expanded services, and marked improvements in provider education
to permit accurate patient counseling. These changes would necessitate a fundamental restructuring of prenatal services. If prenatal di74. Barbara A. Bernhardt et al., Prenatal Genetic Testing: Content of Discussions Between Obstetric Providers and Pregnant Women, 91 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 648, 648
(1998).
75. Id.
76. The concepts of test sensitivity and specificity are important here but beyond the
scope of this discussion. Suffice it to say that screening tests are designed to be highly sensitive but not necessarily specific. When a large population is screened, there is almost always a significant number of false positive test results for each true positive. In the case of
maternal serum AFP screening for neural tube defects, for every one hundred women with
an initially positive test result, only two will have an infant affected with a neural tube defect. See Aubrey Milunsky et al., Predictive Values, Relative Risks, and Overall Benefits of
High and Low Maternal α-Fetoprotein Screening in Singleton Pregnancies: New Epidemiologic Data, 161 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 291, 293 (1989).
77. An alternative approach to a comprehensive standard would be to simply perform
all of the prenatal diagnostic tests for couples that choose prenatal diagnosis without offering education and separate choice about the different kinds of tests on the complete panel.
This would save time on the front end of the testing sequence but would not eliminate the
need to discuss the results of the tests at the other end. Such an approach would not uphold the ideal of informed consent and would pose some difficult dilemmas for couples who
received more information than they really wanted. Of course there would be pressure
from the professional community to limit the number of tests on the panel to a select number of relatively severe and relatively common conditions, but that temptation would have
to be resisted if we wanted a truly comprehensive standard.
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agnosis becomes an increasingly important medical service, these
kinds of changes certainly are feasible. We might envision a whole
new set of professional services to specifically address these needs,
involving new professionals, new payment mechanisms, and new
educational technologies. Until such time, a comprehensive standard
could not be layered onto the current system of prenatal care.
A second concern with a comprehensive standard for information
is that it does not permit an obvious distinction between what information is ethically desirable (presumably all) and what information
might be mandatory. By mandatory here I mean that professionals
could be held legally liable for damages if the information was not
provided. Does a comprehensive standard mean that professionals
could be successfully sued for any relevant information that they
failed to provide to a couple upon the birth of an affected child? There
are many rare conditions, mild conditions, and non-disease related
conditions that are or will be amenable to prenatal diagnosis. It is
one thing to claim that all these capabilities should be discussed with
prospective parents, and quite another to assert that failure to do so
should result in legally enforceable damages. Unless we are willing
to say that a comprehensive standard is both ethically and legally
mandatory, then a line-drawing exercise will be necessary to distinguish between omissions that merit sanction and those that do not.
A third concern with the comprehensive standard relates to the
goals that such a standard seeks to gain. The concern is that linedrawing between different heritable or congenital conditions is hurtful to the community of those with disabilities. This sounds plausible,
although we should not assume that those with disabilities, and
those who have given birth to children with disabilities, are all in
agreement with this point. In any case, the question is whether the
promotion of a comprehensive standard ultimately will be less injurious to those with disabilities. Surely a social standard to encourage
extensive discussion of these capabilities will promote actual use of
the technology. A parallel effort can be made to reduce or eliminate
discriminatory attitudes toward those with disabilities, but it seems
highly likely nonetheless that prenatal diagnosis for an expanding
list of conditions would become increasingly utilized. If so, then it
also seems possible that disability will be seen less as an acceptable
form of human diversity and more as an avoidable burden that people should choose to prevent. The basic point here is that a comprehensive standard for prenatal diagnostic information seems like a
very poor strategy for promoting tolerance for disability.
These considerations leave our quest for professional standards
for prenatal diagnosis on a broad middle ground. Some information is
required in certain circumstances but all potential information need
not nor cannot be provided. In my view, this requires some line-
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drawing. That is, we, as a society, must make a determination of
what kinds of information and tests should be offered for prenatal
diagnosis and which need not be offered. If we accept this general
premise, we must decide on a principle or set of principles by which
such a line could be drawn. In my view, such a line should be drawn
as a matter of professional standard, not as a matter of law or regulation. Further, as I will outline below, I believe the correct ethical
analysis is provided by the wrongful birth torts. More specifically,
the key question is whether the condition often results in tangible
harms to the parents.
The concept of a general “line” in this context is consistent with
recommendations of the majority of public bodies that have commented on this issue. Of course, there will be many arguments about
where a line should be placed on a spectrum of disease severity and
disease prevalence, but the basic concept of a line is familiar. A number of scholars and authoritative committees have raised concerns
over the use of prenatal diagnosis for “mild” conditions or “trivial”
indications. The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research focused primarily on prenatal diagnosis for sex selection, stating:
The idea that it is morally permissible to terminate pregnancy
simply on the ground that a fetus of that sex is unwanted may also
rest on the very dubious notion that virtually any characteristic of
an expected child is an appropriate object of appraisal and selection. Taken to an extreme, this attitude treats a child as an artifact and the reproductive process as a chance to design and produce human beings according to parental standards of excellence,
which over time are transformed into collective standards. . . .
[T]he Commission concludes that although individual physicians
are free to follow the dictates of conscience, public policy should
discourage the use of amniocentesis for sex selection.78

The Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks of the Institute of Medicine took a more concrete stand and recommended that:
prenatal diagnosis not be used for minor conditions or characteristics. In particular, the committee felt strongly that the use of fetal
diagnosis for determination of fetal sex or use of abortion for the
purpose of preferential selection of the sex of the fetus is a misuse
of genetic services that is inappropriate and should be discouraged
by health professionals. . . . The committee believes this issue warrants careful scrutiny over the next three to five years as the
availability of genetic testing becomes more widespread, and espe-

78. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED.
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS 57-58
(1983).

AND
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cially as simpler, safer technologies for prenatal diagnosis are developed.79

The American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs supports limitation of prenatal diagnostic services to more serious conditions. The council suggests: “Selection to avoid genetic
disorders would not always be appropriate. . . . [S]election becomes
more problematic as the effects of the disease become milder and as
they become manifest later in life.”80 The Council states that a variety of factors influence whether prenatal selection for specific conditions would be ethically acceptable. The Council encouraged additional work on the appropriate uses of prenatal diagnosis stating:
“[I]t is important to begin discussion of the issue now to ensure that
appropriate ethical guidelines are in place when new applications become available.”81
Several scholars have taken similar positions. Thomas Murray
concludes, “[i]n short, we should not offer to provide prenatally information about traits or afflictions that are not substantial burdens
on parent and child. We certainly should not assist couples in a misguided quest for the child that embodies their ideal collection of
traits, including gender.”82 Several authors have attempted to draw
more lines to preclude specific uses of prenatal diagnosis. Stephen
Post, Peter Whitehouse and Jeffrey Botkin argued against the use of
prenatal diagnosis for familial Alzheimer disease.83 Carson Strong
argued for no restrictions on prenatal diagnosis for disease related
conditions.84 Strong’s analysis would support a clinician who refused
services for diagnosing nondisease related characteristics.85 Dena
Davis has written about the circumstance in which deaf parents consider using prenatal diagnosis to assure that their child also will be
deaf.86 Davis concludes:
A decision, made before a child is even born, that confines her forever to a narrow group of people and a limited choice of careers, so
violates the child’s right to an open future that no genetic counseling team should acquiesce in it. The very value of autonomy that
79. COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, DIV. OF HEALTH SCIENCES POL’Y, INST. OF
MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 105 (Lori
B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994).
80. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Ethical Issues Related to
Prenatal Genetic Testing, 3 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 633, 638-39 (1994).
81. Id. at 641.
82. THOMAS H. MURRAY, THE WORTH OF A CHILD 139 (1996).
83. See Stephen G. Post et al., Selective Abortion for Familial Alzheimer Disease, 79
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 794 (1992).
84. CARSON STRONG, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND PERINATAL MEDICINE: A NEW
FRAMEWORK 137-48 (1997).
85. Id. at 146.
86. Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 7, 14.
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grounds the ethics of genetic counseling should preclude assisting
parents in a project that so dramatically narrows the autonomy of
the child to be.87

What are the competing considerations for developing a “line”? As
we have seen, there is an expanding array of technical developments
that permit an analysis of the embryo and fetus, potentially with less
physical risk to the prospective mother. Since these tools are available and many couples wish to avoid the birth of a child with disabilities, there is an impetus to ensure that couples are aware of
these options. To the extent that a child with a significant disability
can have an adverse effect on the parents in terms of heartache,
worry, time, effort, and money, the avoidance of these impacts promotes the welfare of the parents. We can say that failure to provide
information about prenatal risks for a child with a significant disability is contrary to the interests of the parents. This concept is consistent with the basic rationale of the wrongful birth suits. However,
this rationale weakens as the adverse impact on the parents weakens. The rationale virtually disappears for conditions that do not
have a significantly adverse effect on the parents.88 This includes, arguably, non-health conditions, mild or treatable conditions, and conditions that do not affect children.
Some in the disability rights advocacy community argue that children with disabilities do not have adverse effects on parents and
families.89 In my view, the advocates are correct that often, very often, the adverse effects are overstated. The literature does not support the notion that children with significant disabilities are a common trigger for divorce, or a source of chronic sorrow, or dysfunction
in families. Such impacts occasionally occur, most often in couples
with marginal coping skills to begin with, but they are not the norm.
The literature tends to suggest that most families cope quite well
with the demands of a disabled child and that the child is loved and
supported as his or her own person and for what he or she brings to
the family. I believe many or most of these parents would not consider the disabled child to have caused a negative impact on the family. So these issues are by no means straightforward. Yet, I think we
can also say that successful coping with a significant disability requires an enormous investment of time, energy, money and lost opportunities. Even though a good outcome is often achieved, the path
is difficult. Further, many parents who have had a child with, say,
Tay Sachs disease or cystic fibrosis use prenatal diagnosis to prevent
87. Id. at 14.
88. See generally Jeffrey R. Botkin, Fetal Privacy and Confidentiality, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 32, 37 (discussing the burdens on parents of disabled
children).
89. See Asch, supra note 30, at 85.
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the birth of a second affected child. So we certainly cannot conclude
that all parents of disabled children view the experience as rewarding on the whole. The basic point here is that although families typically cope very well with the challenges of a disabled child, the experience is sufficiently demanding that many reasonable, sensitive
people would choose to forgo that challenge. Further, the magnitude
of that challenge can be used as a criterion for whether prenatal diagnostic information should be offered.
We might also question whether disabilities have adverse effects
on the children themselves to the extent that prenatal diagnosis and
pregnancy termination would be a preferred alternative for the child.
In my view, criticisms of the wrongful life concept are valid, and it
cannot be argued that prenatal diagnosis and pregnancy termination
are justified on behalf of the child. While there may be rare exceptions to this general conclusion, it is valid for the great majority of
conditions for which prenatal diagnosis is available.
Also in support of a duty to offer prenatal diagnostic information
is the respect we hold for a certain protected sphere of decisionmaking around our reproductive lives. John Robertson argues that
couples should be free to do what they want with their reproductive
lives unless someone else is injured or risks injury on the process.90
This makes sense, although agreement will break down on how we
define injury and risk of injury in this context. Obviously, a big part
of the abortion debate is whether “someone” of moral significance is
being terminated. In any case, the basic point here is that we, as a
society, may want to show somewhat more deference to reproductive
decisions compared to other kinds of medical decisions.
In contrast, there are a number of important considerations that
work to limit the provision of information. The basic fact that embryos are discarded through PGD and fetuses are terminated
through other forms of prenatal diagnosis raises serious ethical concerns. For those who believe that prenatal life should be afforded full
moral status, this whole enterprise is ethically unacceptable. For
many others, embryos and fetuses do not have full moral status as
persons but they have sufficient moral status to preclude destruction
for trivial reasons. Society is likely to remain divided on the moral
status question, but I believe there is sufficient consensus that public
policy about prenatal diagnosis should not promote or condone discarding embryos or terminating fetuses for less than weighty reasons.
A more subtle set of considerations relate to the nature of the parent-child relationship. Parents have broad control over their chil90. See John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 421, 428 (1996).
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dren’s environment, including discipline, diet, religion and education.
Fine-grained prenatal selections could extend this control to the biologic nature of children. To some extent, parents can alter the biology
of children through surgery or medications, but these interventions
are tightly regulated through the medical profession. Any such interventions would only be justified based on the welfare of the child. A
surgeon would not perform plastic surgery on a child at the behest of
a parent’s request unless the surgeon was convinced it was in the
best interest of the child first and foremost. The immediate point is
that society does exert some control over the parent-child relationship to limit the control parents have over many aspects of their children’s lives.
More to the point, however, is the question of whether the selection of children for desirable characteristics will improve the quality
of children’s lives or of the parent-child relationship. Parents do try
to influence and control the lives of their children to a significant extent, but, ultimately, children mature and move toward their own independent goals in life. This is always a complex and often difficult
transition. Many people experience this transition first as a child and
second as a parent. These are both central relationships in life. What
will prenatal diagnosis and selection add to this relationship? To the
extent that strong parent-child relationships are founded on a core of
unconditional love, biologic selections may prove to be damaging to
this central bond in life. This is a nebulous and hypothetical concern
but sufficiently ominous to sustain a policy against broad-based prenatal diagnosis for non-health traits and mild conditions.
Finally, the impact of extensive prenatal diagnosis on those with
disabilities must be considered. At the present time it is probably fair
to say that social supports for those with disabilities have increased
in recent decades despite the development of prenatal diagnostic
technologies. This only means that there is no simple relationship between these social spheres. If prenatal diagnosis becomes a significant and important part of pregnancy management, then concerns
over the impact of this technology on those with disabilities is entirely reasonable. If many prospective parents routinely seek their
perfect child through extensive selections, then perhaps those parents who choose to forgo this technology will be seen as negligent. If
social resources are devoted to selecting “the best” children, perhaps
the disabled children who slip through the net will be the responsibility of their parents to muddle through as best they can. Or, darker
still, perhaps withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining care often
will be deemed appropriate for “defective” children who slip through
the prenatal screen. Some will argue that any of these may come to
pass in decades hence as long as we tolerate prenatal diagnosis at all.
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But surely the risks are greater if we foster the extensive and detailed selection of children.
Each of these considerations deserves more attention than I can
devote here. Nevertheless, we can return to the cases at the beginning and see how this discussion might guide us to a decision. In
Case #1, Dr. Owen failed to provide Molly and Bert information
about the increased risk of Down syndrome by virtue of Molly’s age.
A child with Down syndrome was born. Do they have a legal and
ethical claim against Dr. Owen, who chose not to inform them of the
risk? In most jurisdictions a legal claim would have a strong foundation and, under my analysis, a strong claim for ethical criticism as
well. This has become a familiar enough situation that relatively
clear answers are available.
Case #2 is more problematic. The physician failed to take a full
family history and a child was born with an increased risk of breast
and ovarian cancer as an adult. To date, there is no clear standard
that encourages obstetricians to take a family history of cancer since
cancer is not immediately relevant to the health of the mother or fetus. No cases have been brought as of yet to explicitly raise this issue. Further, there is a general consensus that BRCA1/BRCA2 testing should not be offered in the context of prenatal diagnosis, nor are
children generally offered genetic testing for adult onset conditions
unless preventive measures are appropriate in childhood. The analysis above supports this general consensus. From my perspective, risk
of an adult onset disease in a child does not cause a sufficient impact
on the parents to warrant prenatal diagnosis as a standard of care.
Case #3 was developed as a situation in which prenatal diagnosis
for a “trivial” and non-health related condition (perfect musical pitch)
might seem plausible. Further, the error of the physician was providing false information, not the potentially more excusable error of
omission in failing to inform about testing capabilities. There are no
legal cases to address such a claim, nor can we expect one in the foreseeable future. From an ethical perspective, this analysis provides no
support for the parent’s claim of injury. The notion that a healthy
child embodies a harm to the family because he lacks an extraordinary talent is not sustainable. While perhaps we understand the
parent’s sentiments in this situation, the use of this powerful technology for such a selection is contrary to a set of values that we must
seek to protect. Prenatal diagnosis has appropriate uses, but our society must carefully articulate those uses before we lose too much in
the name of progress.

